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In the United Kingdom, since 2011 data regarding individual police recorded crimes have been made openly available to the
public via the police.uk website. To protect the location privacy of victims these data are obfuscated using geomasking
techniques to reduce their spatial accuracy. This paper examines the spatial accuracy of the police.uk data to determine at
what level(s) of spatial resolution – if any – it is suitable for analysis in the context of theory testing and falsiﬁcation,
evaluation research, or crime analysis. Police.uk data are compared to police recorded data for one large metropolitan Police
Force and spatial accuracy is quantiﬁed for four different levels of geography across ﬁve crime types. Hypotheses regarding
systematic errors are tested using appropriate statistical approaches, including methods of maximum likelihood. Finally, a
“best-ﬁt” statistical model is presented to explain the error as well as to develop a model that can correct it. The implications
of the ﬁndings for researchers using the police.uk data for spatial analysis are discussed.
Keywords: open data; indices of similarity; spatial accuracy; spatial crime analysis; geomasking
Introduction
The political impetus to publish crime statistics online has
grown in the last decade, and has accompanied a more
general move towards the provision of open geographical
data across private and public sector organizations. In the
United Kingdom (UK), since 2011 data regarding indivi-
dual police recorded crimes have been made openly avail-
able to the public via the police.uk website. For the ﬁrst
time, this presents researchers with the potential opportu-
nity to test theories of crime causation at the micro- and
meso-level using data for an entire country, and for eva-
luators of crime reduction initiatives to estimate the impact
of interventions for any location within the UK. However,
while open data offers many such beneﬁts, it suffers from
some notable limitations. For instance, to desensitize it so
that victims are not identiﬁable (a critical criterion of the
UK Data Protection Act, 1998), the data are obfuscated
using geomasking techniques to reduce their spatial accu-
racy. At present it is unknown to what extent (if any) this
process renders the data unsuitable for spatial analysis and
theory testing. Nor is it known at what spatial resolution
the open source crime data might be suitable for such
analysis.
This paper has three primary aims:
● To quantify the spatial accuracy of the open crime
data available on police.uk by comparing it with
police recorded crime data at different levels of
geographic resolution.
● To identify potential sources of systematic error in
the police.uk data and test hypotheses using appro-
priate statistical approaches including methods of
maximum likelihood estimation.
● To develop a “best-ﬁt” statistical model of the true
spatial distribution of (police recorded) crime using
the police.uk and other relevant sources of open
data. The intention is to explain the error as well
as to develop a model that can correct for it.
Ultimately, the paper will assess the extent to which the
open source data could be used to test theories of crime –
or to answer other empirical questions – and what issues
researchers should be aware of when using it.
The paper is organized as follows, in the next section
we provide a comprehensive overview of the police.uk
data. This is followed by a discussion of units of geogra-
phy in spatial analysis. Next, we articulate our research
questions and describe our analytical approach. We then
present ﬁndings and discuss their implications for crimin-
ological enquiry and the conduct of empirical evaluations.
Police.uk data
Although the argument had been made before (see, for
example, Ecclestone 1998), in the UK the Guardian news-
paperisfrequentlycreditedwithstartingtheopendatamove-
ment in 2006 with the “free our data” campaign. In 2010 the
UK Open Government License was created to overcome
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 copyright issues regarding the release of public datasets, and
the data.gov.uk site was launched to provide access to myr-
iad sources of data. The Coalition Government of the day
conspicuouslyadopteda“transparencyagenda”withregards
topublicservicedeliverythatwasimbuedwiththeprinciples
of the open data movement.
The Police – as a public service – and the data they
collected fed into this new “democratic transparency”
program (Hohl, Bradford, and Stanko 2010; Home
Ofﬁce 2010). The aims of publishing such crime data via
crime mapping stemmed from three policy objectives
(Chainey and Tompson 2012):
● To improve the credibility of crime statistics in the
mind of the public;
● Toprovideamorecommunity-focusedpoliceservice;
● To inform, engage and empower the public to par-
ticipate in crime prevention efforts.
Previously, the publication of crime data online via crime
mapshadbeenpiecemeal,withsomeforcesbeingveryactive
in this area,
1 and others not. With political impetus (Home
Ofﬁce 2008), in December 2008 a standardized approach
was adopted across the 43 police forces in England and
Wales. This presented crime data mapped thematically by
administrative areas (mostly but not always at the Census
Middle Super Output Area – which have a mean population
of around 2940 residents). However, as each Force was
responsible for the processing and uploading of their data
to the website, this resulted in an inconsistent range of
geographies being used. The provision of spatial crime data
remained of varying coverage and quality across the country,
which was not conducive to analysis, academic or otherwise.
A step change occurred in December 2010, when
crime data were published on the police.uk website. Data
were presented at the street level alongside additional
information intended to provide sufﬁcient context for the
public to be able to interpret observed patterns. To visua-
lize the data the police.uk website uses graduated point
symbology to depict clusters of crime on particular streets,
which change in size according to the level of geography
at which the maps are viewed.
The police.uk anonymization method
To comply with the UK Data Protection Act 1998, and in
accordance with the Information Commissioner’sO f ﬁce
(Graham 2012;I C O2012) report on the implications of
sharing sensitive crime data, the data visualized – and
available for download – on the police.uk site are processed
according to strict criteria. A key aspect of this process
involves the obfuscation, or geomasking (e.g., Armstrong,
Rushton, and Zimmerman 1999) of crime locations.
Geomasking adds “stochastic or deterministic noise to
the original data matrix by modifying the geographic
coordinates of the data points” (Kwan, Casas, and
Schmitz 2004, 16). Such techniques aim to minimize the
extent to which the anonymized data can be “reverse geo-
coded”–which would threaten an individual’sp r i v a c y–
whilst preserving the general spatial pattern in the data.
Areal aggregation is one technique but this can lead to a
loss of information (e.g., Wieland et al. 2008) and so spatial
epidemiologists have devised a number of alternative meth-
ods using afﬁne and randomizing transformations to name a
few (e.g., Armstrong, Rushton, and Zimmerman 1999;
Cassa et al. 2006; Wieland et al. 2008). In terms of the
impact of geomasking techniques, Leitner and Curtis
(2004) examined how different methods affected student’s
perceptions of the spatial pattern of a sample of Homicide
victim’s residences in Baton Rouge. Other scholars have
examined how geomasking would affect the spatial patterns
observed in geomasked public health data (e.g., Armstrong,
Rushton, and Zimmerman 1999). However, as far as we are
aware, no studies have examined how geomasking techni-
ques have actually affected the spatial accuracy of crime
data (such as the police.uk data) to which a geomask has
been applied and that has subsequently been made publicly
available. This is the aim of the current paper.
Considering the police.uk data in particular, it is likely
that geoprivacy concerns (e.g., Wieland et. al. 2008) have
also motivated the decision by the providers to aggregate
data for some crime types together (e.g., burglaries to
dwellings with burglaries to non-dwellings) and to only
release the data on a monthly basis
2 (the last working day
of the subsequent month). The less frequently the data are
released, the less likely it is that residents will be able to
correlate local news of crimes in their area with locations
of crime events. Data release timing is thus used as a
means of privacy protection (Kounadi, Bowers, and
Leitner 2014).
In terms of the process employed in the UK, each of
the 43 UK police forces upload crime incident data in a
standardized format to a secure server on a monthly basis
(in most cases). A spatial “jitter” is then applied so that no
actual crime event location is identiﬁable (see, Bridwell
2007) as follows (Police.uk 2014):
● The location of each crime is compared against a
master list of “snap points” to ﬁnd the nearest (see
below).
● The coordinates of the crime are then replaced with
the coordinates of the snap point.
● If the nearest snap point is over 20 km away, coor-
dinates of zero are assigned so that the crime is not
shown on the subsequent map.
The master list of “snap points”–which is not publicly
available – contains over 750,000 points, generated so that
they appear over the center point of a street, or above a
public place such as a commercial premise or public land.
3
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 Points are never placed over speciﬁc dwellings. Each point
has a catchment area that contains at least eight postal
addresses
4 (in 2011 this threshold was 12), or no addresses
at all. The list is continually updated by representatives in
the police forces so that key locations (such as railway
stations or premises of interest) are represented in the
database.
This process has an obvious impact on the positional
accuracy of the data. They are necessarily inexact when
there is a chance of a victim being identiﬁed. However, for
research and other purposes, the question is whether the
spatial patterning of crime is preserved in the data or if it
is obscured in some way and, if so, how? The accuracy of
the point patterns observed in the data is, in part, deter-
mined by the database of snap points employed and these
issues are in addition to the fact that there may be inherent
recording inaccuracies in the original crime data. For
example, some crimes may occur at places that are not
represented in a gazetteer system – commonly referred to
as non-addressables (for other examples see Ratcliffe
2001; Chainey and Ratcliffe 2005).
Developments and critiques of police.uk data
When initially launched, the police.uk website drew large-
scale criticism due to anecdotal errors that were identiﬁed
in the data (Daily Mail 2011a). For example, crimes were
erroneously attributed to quiet cul-de-sacs by virtue of
their close proximity to police stations – to which some
offenses, for which the locations were unknown, had been
geocoded by the police. Moreover, the data seemed not to
represent the riots in the summer of 2011 (Daily Mail
2011b). In truth, the public – including reporters – were
not aware of the nuances of geographic crime data, or the
geomasking methods used by the police.uk site to protect
the privacy of victims. However, the question of how
accurate the spatial data are remains.
As well as the loss of spatial information caused by the
use of snap points, some other privacy-driven limitations
of police.uk are noteworthy. The grouping and categoriza-
tion of crimes can further obfuscate the data. For example,
all violent and sexual offences are aggregated into a single
category. This category includes all assaults, regardless of
the degree of injury caused, such that murders are counted
equally with assaults that caused no injury at all. Finally,
fraud offences are excluded from police.uk data entirely.
Over time, the police.uk site has undergone a number
of developments. Some of the crime types have been
disaggregated so that the crime categories are less coarse.
5
A customizable area tool was introduced so that users of
the site can view local crime patterns by police geography
(e.g., local neighborhood police area), or within a one-
mile radius from a postcode, or for a self-drawn area.
Temporal trends were also provided so that users could
see how crime rates have changed over time. Crime
outcome information was also added so that the public
could see the criminal justice outcome for an event.
Units of geographic analysis
Geographic data can be visualized and analyzed at multi-
ple scales of interest. The choice of which unit of analysis
to employ (e.g., micro, meso or macro) has been a per-
ennial topic of debate amongst geographers for several
decades (Anselin and Getis 1992). Research concerned
with crime is no exception.
Typicalunits used inthe spatial analysisofcrime include
preexisting census geography (e.g., Output Areas and multi-
ples thereof in the UK, or Blocks, Groups and Tracts in the
US) or politically designed administrative areas (e.g.,
Parishes, Wards, Local Authorities or Counties). These are
often employed because other data are collected at these
levels of geography that permit statistical comparison. In
terms of theory testing and falsiﬁcation, it is important that
the geographical unit selected should match the spatial scale
over which the theoretical mechanisms of interest are
hypothesized to operate as crime can form very different
patterns at different scales of analyses (Brantingham,
Dyreson, and Brantingham 1976; see also, Hipp 2007;
Ouimet 2000; Wooldredge 2002).
This illustrates the Modiﬁable Areal Unit Problem or
MAUP (Openshaw 1984; see also Bailey and Gattrell
1995) which can occur when point data (including
crime) are aggregated into areal units. In the above exam-
ple, the problem concerns spatial scale and the fact that
patterns displayed at large geographic units can mask
important heterogeneity that may be observed for smaller
units of analysis (Robinson 1950).
The extent to which this a problem will, as noted,
depend upon the theory tested, or the purpose of the
analysis undertaken. The point of central importance is
that perceived patterns in aggregated data can be inﬂu-
enced by the precise choice of unit and the associated
boundaries, and changing these can lead to potential errors
of inference. This problem may (or may not) be exacer-
bated for research based on the analysis of police.uk data
as the original point data are “allocated” to one set of
boundaries (deﬁned by the snap points) as part of the
anonymization process.
Considering the spatial analysis of crime more speci-
ﬁcally, this can be undertaken for at least three purposes:
the targeting of crime reduction resources, applied evalua-
tion research, and academic enquiry. In policing circles,
the aim of analysis is typically to better understand the
clustering, or concentration of crime so that resources can
be allocated appropriately (e.g., Bowers, Johnson, and
Pease 2004; Chainey and Ratcliffe 2005). For these pur-
poses, it makes sense to employ a unit of analysis that is
relevant to the decision-maker. In the case of tactical
policing, small spatial units will frequently be preferred
Cartography and Geographic Information Science 3
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 as police commanders will have limited resources avail-
able and hence will likely want to deploy them to a limited
number of precise locations.
For more strategic (longer-term) approaches to crime
reduction that involve multi-agency groups (which bring
together a consortium of public agencies responsible for
dealing with the effects of crime) a meso-level adminis-
trative geography may be used, partly because this will be
familiar to all partners but also because this will reﬂect the
spatial scale over which they will jointly be responsible.
Evaluation research may be conducted at a range of spatial
scales, and should align with the area over which inter-
ventions are implemented and are consequently antici-
pated to have an impact.
In academic research, spatial analysis is usually con-
ducted with the express purpose of generating insight into
the causal processes that inﬂuence crime occurrence. As
Weisburd, Bruinsma, and Bernasco (2009, 24) stress, “The
unit of analysis for geographic crime studies cannot be
divorced from the social contexts of crime and criminals.”
The immediate context, or environment, of crime is central
to several criminological theories (Brantingham and
Brantingham 1991; Cornish and Clarke 1986; Wikstrom
2006), yet the “environment” is a somewhat nebulous
concept and no universal criterion exists to deﬁne it in a
geographic sense. Most studies undertaken under the rub-
ric of these theories use aggregated crime data as the
outcome or dependent variable in spatial analysis, with
the unit size varying tremendously across studies. For
example, the unit of analysis used in research concerned
with “micro places” has ranged from US census blocks
(Bernasco and Block 2011); clusters of a hundred
addresses on a street (Groff, Weisburd, and Morris 2009;
Weisburd et al. 2004), and street segments (Johnson and
Bowers 2010), also known as block faces (Groff,
Weisburd, and Yang 2010; Smith, Frazee, and Davison
2000) to individual buildings and addresses (Polvi et al.
1991; Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger 1989).
Research completed in the tradition of social disorga-
nization theory (Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson,
Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Kubrin and Weitzer 2003)
in particular focuses on the relationship between crime and
neighborhood characteristics as, according to the theory,
important social processes that operate at the neighbor-
hood or community level inﬂuence the occurrence of
crime. Such studies have examined patterns for “neighbor-
hoods” varying in size, although the US census tract is the
most common (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). Clearly then,
academic research and analyses conducted by practitioners
alike frequently employ data aggregated to a variety of
spatial scales, and might take advantage of data such as
that provided on the police.uk website. Whether this is
appropriate, of course, depends upon the spatial accuracy
of the data.
The current study
To examine the spatial accuracy of the police.uk data, we
compared it with the police recorded crime data used to
generate it, using data for the West Midlands Police Force
area. This area is predominantly metropolitan, covering
three cities and 22 large- and medium- sized towns, and
encompasses a wide range of urban geography. Both data-
sets were ﬁrst aggregated to four different areal units of
analysis using a geographical information system (GIS).
The areal units considered were UK postcodes (PC), cen-
sus output areas (OA), lower super output areas (LSOA),
and middle layer super output areas (MSOA). The latter
three types of area are commonly used to test ecological
theories of crime (see above), while the ﬁrst provides
insight as to the spatial accuracy of the police.uk data at
a very ﬁne level of resolution. Figure 1 provides an
illustration of the boundaries for the different Census
units of analysis, while Table 1 provides descriptive sta-
tistics regarding the mean area, population and number of
households for the same units.
6
Three analytic strategies were adopted. For the ﬁrst,
we sought to quantify the extent to which the area level
counts generated using the sample of police.uk data agree
with those for the police recorded crime data at each
spatial scale considered. For the second, we tested hypoth-
eses (see below) regarding those area-level factors that
km km
MSOA
LSOA
OA
N
1.6 0.8 0.4 0 19 9.5 4.75 0
Figure 1. Illustration of the nested Census geographic units. Contains National Statistics data © Crown copyright and database right
2012. Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database right 2012.
4 L. Tompson et al.
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 might signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the spatial accuracy of the
police.uk data. Finally, we sought to establish whether a
spatial model that uses the police.uk data and that incor-
porates these factors can be used to improve the estimates
and, if so, by how much.
Different types of crime typically exhibit different
geographical patterns and varying levels of spatial cluster-
ing. Consequently, we examine the spatial accuracy of the
data for different categories of crime, in this case:
● antisocial behavior;
● burglary (which includes burglaries to dwellings
and non-dwellings);
● criminal damage and arson;
● robbery (commercial robbery and robbery to the
person); and
● vehicle crime (including theft of, and from, a vehicle).
Before describing the methods employed and our ﬁndings,
we consider some of the factors that might lead to sys-
tematic inconsistencies in the spatial patterns observed for
analyses conducted using police recorded crime and
police.uk data. First, we hypothesize that there will be
differences across crime types. One reason for this is that
some types of crime are harder to accurately geocode than
others. For example, in the UK when a burglary to a
dwelling is reported, the police can precisely determine
the location of the dwelling using a gazetteer of postal
addresses. However, for crimes that happen at “non-
addressable” locations such as a park, subway or outbuild-
ing, it is more difﬁcult to assign exact coordinates to the
crime location, even if the victim can provide an exact
description of the location (which they might not be able
to do). For such locations, it is likely that there will be
fewer “snap points” in the police.uk database, which
would be expected to lead to inaccuracy in the data.
Burglary is the only type of crime that, by deﬁnition,
occurs in a deﬁned building (although sometimes those
buildings will be located in gardens or yards), which
means that it is less subject to data recording inaccura-
cies. However, other types of crime are affected to differ-
ing degrees. For instance, most vehicle crime occurs on
the street or in the vicinity of people’s residences, but a
s m a l lp r o p o r t i o nh a p p e ni np arking lots or other areas,
which will be less well represented in police gazetteer
systems.
A preliminary analysis of the police.uk data illustrates
this point. The results shown in Table 2 – derived by
inspecting the “location type” ﬁeld included in the police.
uk data – indicate the percentages of crimes that were
indexed to addressable locations for each type of crime.
Those for which the location was reported as occurring in a
“park/open space,”“ parking area,”“ pedestrian subway”
and “sports/recreation area” were classiﬁed as non-addres-
sable. It is apparent that most crimes are indexed to addres-
sable locations, but that geo-coding accuracy is likely to be
highest for the crimes burglary, criminal damage and arson,
and vehicle crime.
On the basis of the above logic, we expect the
spatial accuracy of the police.uk dataset to vary between
crime types, conditional on the degree to which they
occur at locations that are more easily addressable.
Speciﬁcally:
H1 – we anticipate the spatial accuracy of the police.uk
data to be highest for the crimes of burglary, crim-
inal damage and arson, and vehicle crime.
Given the way in which the police.uk “snap point”
database was constructed (see above):
H2 – we anticipate the police.uk data to be the most
accurate for larger geographic units of analysis, in
this case the MSOA and LSOA census
geographies.
Table 1. Summary information for population and households for the UK and the West Midlands study area.
UK West Midlands
Geography n
Median
size (km
2)
Mean
population
Mean
households n
Median
size (km
2)
Mean
population
Mean
households
Output Area 181,408 0.07 309 129 8468 0.06 323 128
Lower Super Output Area 34,753 20.56 609 470 1680 20.78 620 455
Middle Super Output Area 7201 91.92 2940 2271 356 93.59 2928 2148
Table 2. Per cent of crimes recorded as happening at an addres-
sable location.
Crime type
Offences at addressable
location-types
Anti-social behavior 91.4%
Burglary 95.7%
Criminal damage and arson 95.7%
Robbery 91.3%
Vehicle crime 95.3%
Cartography and Geographic Information Science 5
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 On a similar note, because the residential population in
an area will directly inﬂuence the number of snap points to
be found within it:
H3 – we predict that – all else equal – more spatial error
will be observed for areas with smaller populations,
However, the number of snap points in an area will not
be determined solely by the number of residents within it.
In particular, given the way the police.uk snap point
database was constructed, the number of street segments
within an area should – all else equal – inﬂuence the
number of snap points within it. Thus:
H4 – we predict that at the area level, the spatial accuracy
of the police.uk data will be highest for areas with a
larger number of roads within them.
H5 – A ﬁnal hypothesis that concerns the inﬂuence of the
snap point database is that as it has been improved
over time through the addition of new snap points
(supplied by Police Forces to more accurately
reﬂect locations of relevance to crime occurrence),
the spatial accuracy of the police.uk data should
also have improved over time, being more accurate
for the most recent years.
The next three hypotheses consider the interaction
between the morphology of the census geographies con-
sidered and the police.uk “snap point” database. First,
census units are (approximately) standardized by popula-
tion, and consequently the geographic size of a census
area provides an indication of “urban density” or how
much open space there is likely to be within it. As larger
areas will have lower urban density (for a discussion of
geomasking techniques based on population density, see
Cassa et al. 2006), they are likely to have fewer snap
points within them, and hence:
H6 – we predict that in larger areas – which will likely
have lower urban density as census areas have
similar population sizes – there will be a greater
risk of crimes that occurred within them being
relocated to a snap point outside their boundary.
Second, areas with more nondomestic land-use are
also likely to have fewer snap points within them per
unit area, and so:
H7 – we expect the spatial accuracy of the police.uk data
to be lower for areas with more nondomestic land
uses within them.
Third, census boundaries are often delineated by major
roads, with one side of a major road being in one area, the
one opposite in another. However, as the police.uk snap
point data-set was derived in a different way using
Voronoi polygons (see below):
H8 – we anticipate there to be larger differences in area
level counts of crime estimated using the police
recorded crime and police.uk data for areas with
major roads in them.
Finally, urban form tends to differ in a variety of ways
as the distance from the nearest urban center increases. For
example, locations near to urban centers may have con-
straints associated with the amount and location of land
available for housing stock. This may result in small
pockets of high-density housing, but more generally resi-
dential housing may be more dispersed the nearer an area
is to an urban center. An area may also have a greater mix
of, and variation in, land uses the closer it is to an urban
center. Such variation may inﬂuence the number of snap
points in a census area, as well as their spatial distribution.
In theory, this variation should affect the spatial accuracy
of the police.uk data:
H9 – we predict there to be decreasing accuracy in the
police.uk data the closer an area is to the city
center.
Method
Data preparation
Police recorded crime data were provided by West
Midlands Police (UK) for the years 2011 to 2013, and it
is for this Force area that the analyses are conducted.
Police.uk data from the same period (and same area)
were downloaded from the website via the application
programming interface (API). The data preparation was
undertaken in the following sequence.
First, the crime categories provided in the police.uk
were inspected to ﬁnd categories, or combinations of them
in the police recorded crime data that could serve as
comparators. The crime type categories used by police.
uk did not align exactly with the crime type categories
commonly used by the police so required some matching.
For example, for the police recorded crime data, arson and
criminal damage were aggregated into one category for
consistency with the police.uk data. In the case of anti-
social behavior (ASB) it was necessary to exclude inci-
dents from the police recorded crime data that had no
geographic coordinates (many of which were classiﬁed
as hoax calls). This resulted in a loss of approximately
one per cent of the ASB data.
Next, the crime data from both data sources were
“joined” to the nearest areal unit for each level of analysis
(postcode, OA, LSOA and MSOA).
7 Spatial lag values
representing the mean count of crimes in adjacent areas
were created for each area, year and crime type.
8 The
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 distance to the nearest urban center was calculated as the
distance of each unit boundary to the nearest city center.
As the inﬂuence of urban centers is likely to be more
pronounced the closer an area is to one, the logarithm of
the distance was used in all analyses.
The “Area of Non Domestic Buildings” was calculated
using data from the Generalized Land Use Database.
9
These data were collected at the 2001 census OA level,
which led to instances where 2011 OAs were not directly
comparable. Where a 2011 OAs comprised multiple 2001
OAs, the values were aggregated accordingly. Where 2011
OA had no corresponding 2001 OA (and therefore had
missing nondomestic building data), we assigned the mean
value observed across all OAs.
The length of different types of roads (any or major
roads) in an area were computed using data from the
integrated transport network (ITN). Twelve output areas
had no roads at all, and so were given a value of 0 for each
type of road.
Analytic strategy and results
How similar are area level counts of police.uk and police
recorded crime data?
A number of analytic approaches could be used to exam-
ine the similarity of the spatial pattern in the two sources
of data.
10 Here, we use Andresen’s( 2009) spatial point
pattern test. Shown as Equation (1), this is a global index
designed to examine the similarity in spatial patterns for
two samples of spatial data aggregated to some areal unit.
S ¼
1
N
:
X N
i¼1
si (1)
where, N is the number of areal units considered,
si is equal to one if the counts of events from two
different sources in area i are similar, and zero otherwise.
To test for similarity in spatial patterns, one source of
data is used as a reference data-set (sometimes referred to as
the “gold standard”) against which the other is compared.
Conﬁdence intervals are estimated for the point estimate of
the crime count for the reference data-set and similarity is
established if the values for the second data-set fall within
this interval. In other words, the counts from two sources of
data are considered to be “similar” if any difference
between the counts could be explained by sampling error.
The conﬁdence intervals are estimated using a simple non-
parametric bootstrap methodology. Implemented in the R
programming language (http://www.R-project.org), a
Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate the estimates
as follows: (1) M events are sampled (with replacement)
from the full set of (M) observed events using a uniform
random number generator; (2) area level counts are com-
puted for the sampled data; (3) this process is repeated
many times (in this case 100 times) to generate a distribu-
tion of counts for each area; (4) the mean count (and 95%
conﬁdence intervals) for each area are computed using the
data from the 100 iterations. As two sources of data may
have different overall counts of crime (due to the aggrega-
tion of offense types to categories – see above), and
because the test is concerned with the extent to which the
spatial patterns are similar, rather than testing the absolute
differences in counts, it is the percentage of crime (i.e., the
area count divided by the total) associated with each area
that is compared.
To illustrate how the conﬁdence intervals are con-
structed, Figure 2 shows an example of the mean values
and 95% conﬁdence intervals generated using the police
recorded crime data for the crime of burglary at the census
OA level (N = 8468). For each OA, the mean values and
the associated conﬁdence intervals generated using the
MC simulation are plotted against the values observed in
the police recorded crime data. As would be expected, the
mean values obtained from the MC simulation are largely
identical to the observed values. For this example, the
values for the police.uk data (not shown in Figure 2)
were within the conﬁdence intervals computed for the
police recorded crime data for 6123 of the 8468 compar-
isons. Consequently, the global value of S (similarity) was
6123/8468 = 0.72. As well as providing a global index of
similarity, the approach allows the speciﬁc areas that are
similar to be identiﬁed, mapped or analyzed. Figure 3
shows a map of those areas that had similar (and nonsi-
milar) values for the police.uk and police recorded crime
data for burglary in 2012.
The above procedure was repeated for each spatial unit
of analysis (MSOAs, LSOAs, OAs, and postcodes), for
each type of crime (burglary, vehicle crime, ASB, criminal
damage, and robbery), for each year data were available
(2011, 2012, and 2013) and for the aggregate period 2011–
2013. To simplify presentation, the (set of 20) results are
displayed for each spatial unit of analysis separately.
Figure 4 shows the results for the MSOA geography.
In addition to showing the index of similarity, the columns
near the y-axis enumerate the overall counts of crimes for
each source of data. It is apparent that the counts are
similar, but not identical. This is due to the way in
which recorded crimes are aggregated to more general
categories of offenses in the police.uk data.
At this level of resolution, the indices of similarity are
generally high, typically between 0.9 and 0.95. That is,
around 90% of MSOAs have similar counts of crime for
estimates generated using the two sources of data. This
is particularly the case for the crimes of burglary, vehicle
crime and robbery. With the exception of criminal damage,
it also appears to be the case that levels of similarity
have increased over time, as predicted (Hypothesis 5).
Moreover, levels of similarity appear to be greater for
comparisons made for each year than for the aggregate
Cartography and Geographic Information Science 7
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 period 2011–2013. The pattern was least consistent for
incidents of ASB, but the data appear to have improved
substantially over time.
At the LSOA level, patterns are again quite similar
across the two data sources (see Figure 5), although the
overall level consistency is lower at around 0.85. The
exception to this is for robbery for which the yearly
estimates (around 0.7) are the lowest for all crimes con-
sidered. Otherwise the patterns are in line with those
observed at the MSOA level. This is not surprising
given that LSOAs and MSOAs are both quite large areas
(see Table 1).
Figure 6 presents results at the OA level. This shows,
with the exception of ASB, patterns are more consistent
Figure 2. Mean values and 95% conﬁdence intervals for one sample of data plotted against the observed values.
km
N
Index of
similarity
similar2012
0
1
12 9 6 3 1.5 0
Figure 3. Indices of similarity values mapped for 2012 burglary data. Contains National Statistics data © Crown copyright and database
right 2012. Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database right 2012.
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 for the aggregate period 2011–2013 than they are for any
one-year interval. Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2,
levels of similarity are generally lower for this (smaller)
unit of analysis, and, are best for the crimes of burglary
and vehicle crime (over 0.6 for each one-year interval and
around 0.75 for the 2011–2013 interval). They were parti-
cularly poor for the crime of robbery, being only slightly
above 0.2 for the three one-year periods considered. At
this level of resolution, with the exception of robbery, it
also appears to be the case that the spatial accuracy of the
police.uk data has improved over time (substantially for
incidents of criminal damage), as predicted.
As shown in Figure 7 and consistent with Hypothesis
2, the index of similarity was the lowest observed for
analyses conducted at the postcode level (0.2 or less). In
line with Hypothesis 1, levels of consistency were
0.0
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Figure 4. Analysis of similarity at the MSOA level.
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Figure 5. Analysis of similarity at the LSOA level.
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Figure 6. Analysis of similarity at the OA level.
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 particularly poor for the crime of robbery. As with ana-
lyses conducted at the OA level, the level of consistency
appears to have increased over time, but was highest for
the aggregated interval 2011–2013.
What area level factors inﬂuence the spatial accuracy of
police.uk data?
To test hypotheses regarding factors that are associated
with the spatial accuracy of the police.uk data, we use
logistic regression models to see if there are systematic
differences between the types of areas for which the
police.uk and police recorded crime are similar and those
for which they are not. Analyses were conducted for each
of the different census geographies considered (census
data were not available at the postcode level), but those
shown are for census OAs. The reason for this is that for
the MSOA and LSOA geographies, the Police.uk data
were on the whole rather accurate.
11 Table 3 shows the
results from ﬁve logistic regression analyses, one for each
type of crime. All analyses were conducted using data for
the aggregate period 2011–2013.
The results provide fairly consistent support for
Hypotheses 3, 4, 6 and 8, with the coefﬁcients being in
the direction expected in all cases, expect for the amount
of major road in an area for the crime of robbery. That is,
areas with a greater amount of road in them (all coefﬁ-
cients were in the right direction, and four out of ﬁve were
statistically signiﬁcant), with a larger population (four out
of ﬁve tests were statistically signiﬁcant), a smaller geo-
graphic area (four out of ﬁve coefﬁcients were in the right
direction, and two out of ﬁve were statistically signiﬁcant),
or (with the exception of robbery for which the reverse
was true) less major roads (with four out of ﬁve tests being
statistically signiﬁcant) in them tend to display similarity
across the two sources of data.
Some support is also found for Hypothesis 7 that
levels of similarity would be lower for areas with more
nondomestic land use in them (four out of ﬁve coefﬁ-
cients were in the right direction, and two tests were
statistically signiﬁcant), although the ﬁndings are non-
signiﬁcant for vehicle crime and criminal damage.
Moreover, for robbery we ﬁnd that OAs with more area
of non-domestic land use are actually more (rather than
less) likely to have similar estimates, although the effect
is small. Apropos Hypothesis 9, with the exception of
robbery, we ﬁnd that areas located further from the city
center are more likely to have similar values across the
two data-sets. In the case of robbery, the reverse appears
to be the case. In sum, whilst at least partial support is
provided for all of our hypotheses, there are some differ-
ences across crime types.
Robbery 2013
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Robbery 2011
Robbery Total
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Crim Dam 2012
Crim Dam 2011
ASB 2013
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Burglary 2013
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Figure 7. Analysis of similarity at the postcode level.
Table 3. Logistic regression analysis of sources of inconsistency in the police.uk data.
Burglary Vehicle Crime ASB Criminal Damage Robbery
e
β ze
β ze
β ze
β ze
β z
Road Length/km 1.59*** 7.05 1.23** 3.64 1.24*** 4.12 1.08 1.41 1.14** 2.61
Major Road Length/km 0.71* −2.95 0.67*** −3.88 0.69*** −3.87 0.89 −1.15 1.54* 4.35
Area of Nondomestic 0.99*** −4.16 0.99 −1.35 0.99** −3.51 0.99 −0.21 1.01*** 5.18
Population/100 1.07* 2.016 1.09** 2.69 0.97 −1.08 1.20*** 5.32 1.33*** 8.96
Area 0.63* −2.13 0.82 −1.34 1.06 0.36 0.84 −1.29 0.47*** −4.83
Log (distance to nearest city) 1.29*** 6.16 1.37*** 8.33 1.25*** 6.22 1.03 0.89 0.76*** −4.83
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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 Can the police.uk estimates be improved?
Given that the analyses presented above suggest that
there are systematic biases in the police.uk data, the
possibility exists that simple spatial models could be
used to improve the area level estimates generated
using the data. To examine this, we use regression mod-
els to try to correct for the error in the data. In the ﬁrst
instance, we ﬁt parameters using a training or in-sample
data-set (2012 data). In the second, we apply these para-
meters to an out of sample data-set (2013 data) to exam-
ine the utility of the approach. Rather than reporting the
results for all possible analyses, for the reason discussed
in the previous section, we report those conducted using
data for census OA areas.
Before presenting ﬁndings, we rehearse the logic of
the approach. In the event that the police.uk data ﬁt the
ofﬁcial recorded crime data well, the generic model shown
in Equation (2) should describe the data.
xi;t;c ¼ β0 þ β1yi;t;c (2)
where, xi,t,c is the count of ofﬁcial police recorded crime in
location i at time t for crime type c
yi,t,c is the count of police.uk crime at location i at time
t for crime type c
and the β are parameters to be estimated empirically
However, as suggested above, at lower levels of spa-
tial resolution systematic errors are introduced into the
data due to the way in which the police.uk data are
generated. To improve the model (of ofﬁcial police
recorded crime data), a spatial lag term may be added to
model the spatial error associated with the geomasking
procedure applied during the generation of the police.uk
data. That is, we assume that some of the crimes that
actually occurred in (say) area A will have been erro-
neously allocated to neighboring areas. Thus, by modeling
the counts for adjacent areas we seek to correct for this
error. The model can be written as follows:
xi;t;c ¼ β0 þ β1yi;t;c þ β1y
j
i;t;c (3)
where, y
|
i,t,c is the count of police.uk crime in the imme-
diately neighboring areas of location i at time t for crime
type c (the neighbors for each area were identiﬁed using
the Queen’s criterion).
Additional independent variables were included to
model the biases discussed in the previous section,
which results in a model of the form:
xi;t;c ¼ β0 þ β1yi;t;c þ β2y
j
i;t;c þ
X Nþ3
j¼3
βjzi;j (4)
where, N is the number of independent variables included
in the model, and
zi,j is a vector of values for variable j for area i
A number of approaches were used to examine the
utility of the models produced, but for comparison with
the analyses presented above, we report the index of
similarity, calculated using the values predicted by the
spatial model. In the event that the model is of value,
these should be greater to those reported in Figure 6.
Table 4 shows the coefﬁcients for each type of crime,
estimated using a linear model and the police.uk 2012
data.
12 It also shows the index of similarity for the 2013
data computed using the police.uk data alone, and using
the estimates computed using the spatial model. In the
case of burglary, all of the coefﬁcients were statistically
signiﬁcant and the estimates based on the spatial model
are clearly an improvement on the police.uk data alone.
In each case, estimates based on the spatial model
offer an improvement over the police.uk data. As the
parameters estimated for one year (2012) were used to
compute the predictions for another (2013) this suggests
that the inﬂuences identiﬁed are stable to some degree,
and that there is beneﬁt in taking this kind of approach.
Considering general trends in the coefﬁcients, three
(police.uk, police.uk lag and nondomestic area) of the
Table 4. Linear regression analysis of police recorded crime data, and index of similarity for original police.uk and (police.uk) modeled
data.
Burglary Vehicle Crime ASB Criminal Damage Robbery
Intercept 1.26** 0.29 4.09** 0.29 0.77**
Police.uk2012 0.66** 0.44** 0.87** 0.43** 0.79**
Police.uk2012 Lag 0.19** 0.14** 0.06** 0.14** 0.08**
Total Rd 0.01** −0.01* 0.00 −0.01* 0.01**
Major Roads −0.15 0.12 −0.18** 0.12 −0.01
Area −0.57** 0.05 1.11* 0.01 −0.22**
Nondomestic 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 0.01** 0.01**
Dist City −0.13** 0.01 −0.39** 0.01 −0.09**
Soriginal 2013 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.58 0.21
Smodel 2013 0.79 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.29
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.001.
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 independent variables differed in magnitude but were in
the same direction for all crime types. For the total length
of road variable, the coefﬁcients were small but varied in
direction. For the major roads and distance to the city
center variables, those coefﬁcients that were statistically
signiﬁcant were in the same direction.
Thus, there is some consistency in the ﬁndings across
crime types, but the coefﬁcient estimates are by no means
identical. This is not surprising for at least two reasons.
First, differences in magnitude are to be expected as the
number of offenses differs across crime types. Second,
different types of crime exhibit different spatial patterns,
and so will be susceptible to different types of spatial error
in the police.uk data. The ﬁndings thereby suggest that
different models will be necessary for different types of
crime.
Discussion
The provision of publicly accessible data regarding the
location of crime events for the whole of England and
Wales presents a substantial opportunity for academics to
test criminological theories, or to examine how crime
patterns vary over space and time. It also presents sub-
stantial opportunities for practitioners engaged in crime
reduction more directly, as data sharing protocols often
impede access to crime data – even for crime reduction
agencies. This is particularly the case for the analysis of
crime problems that cross geographical/jurisdictional bor-
ders. Consequently, the data may offer solutions to prac-
tical issues that agencies face on a day-to-day basis, as
well as facilitating research that informs our understanding
of crime. Of course, the data also provide the public with
the opportunity to examine online maps that show the
locations of crime events. However, to protect the anon-
ymity of victims, the police.uk data have necessarily been
obfuscated with a geomasking technique, which inﬂuences
their spatial accuracy. The aim of this paper was to exam-
ine the extent to which this is the case and to determine at
what level(s) of spatial resolution – if any – the police.uk
data are suitable for analysis (formal or otherwise).
Comparing the police.uk data to the police recorded
crime data used to generate it, as expected (Hypothesis 1),
we ﬁnd that for large areal units, such as MSOAs the
spatial accuracy of the data is very good. The same is
true for the slightly smaller LSOA unit of geography,
particularly for the crimes of burglary, vehicle crime and
criminal damage. For smaller geographical units, particu-
larly at the postcode level, however, it becomes clear that
there is considerable spatial error in the data.
This has important implications for the types of the-
ories that researchers might plausibly test using police.uk
data. The social processes deemed relevant to some eco-
logical theories are hypothesized to function at a micro-
level of place (see Weisburd, Bernasco and Bruinsma
2009), and so, for these theories, the police.uk data may
have limited application. However for those theories
which assume social forces exert their inﬂuence at the
neighborhood level (e.g., social disorganization theory),
the use of the police.uk data may be entirely appropriate
meaning that, for the ﬁrst time, researchers can test such
theories using data for an entire country.
The inaccuracy prevalent at smaller levels of geogra-
phy, such as postcodes, also affects the interpretation of
crime patterns by users of the police.uk website. The
negative media coverage in the weeks following the
launch of the site indicates that many users do not take
the time to acquaint themselves with the way in which the
data are obfuscated – despite this information being avail-
able and accessible. There is thus considerable potential
for crime patterns at the local level to be misinterpreted by
users of the police.uk website.
However, even at the small area level, all may not be
lost. Our analyses suggest that there are systematic biases
associated with the way the police.uk data are generated.
The identiﬁcation of such biases is useful insofar as it
presents the opportunity to model and correct for these
in any analysis of the data. The analyses presented above
illustrate one way in which such modeling might be
achieved. Alternative methods of modeling (spatial)
spill-over effects or to correct for spatial autocorrelation
produced by unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., see Anselin
1988) can similarly assess the effect of the “jitter” proce-
dure applied to the police.uk data. Unfortunately, produ-
cing modeled estimates of crime counts in the way
illustrated in this paper will only be possible for those
with access to the original police recorded crime data.
And, those with access to such data would presumably
have no use for the police.uk data. However, even those
without access to such data can include independent vari-
ables in their statistical models to attempt to correct for the
biases in the police.uk data identiﬁed here.
Moreover, if the estimated parameters reported here
prove to be applicable to other geographical areas, it may
be possible to produce a “general” model that could be
used more universally. Whether this is feasible is an
empirical question, and it is important to point out that
the analyses reported here are for a sample of data. While
they are generally consistent with a-priori expectations, it
is possible that different patterns would be observed for
other police force areas. Consequently, replication studies
will be important to establish the generalizability of our
ﬁndings.
At this point, it is important to revisit the issue of
statistical aggregation to areal units discussed in the intro-
duction. Aside from the points already considered, one
issue associated with the analysis of data aggregated to
some geography is that the boundaries employed are not
created with crime analysis in mind; they are generally
artiﬁcially constructed for political or administrative
12 L. Tompson et al.
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 purposes. For example, census areas may be constructed
so as to produce neighborhoods with homogeneous socio-
demographic characteristics, but they often fail to reﬂect
the sociospatial distribution of land use, people and crime
events that will be of interest to crime analysts (Rengert
and Lockwood 2009). This issue is above and beyond
those associated with the spatial accuracy of the data
analyzed.
Regardless of such issues, in the current paper we
examined the spatial accuracy of the data at the areal
unit level. The primary reason for this was, as discussed
in the introduction, that crime data are frequently analyzed
in this way for a variety of purposes. However, future
studies could examine the spatial accuracy of the data at
the street segment level. Street segments represent a ﬁne
spatial scale – similar in size to the postcode geography
examined here – but given that the “snap point” database
was essentially generated at the street segment level, it is
possible that the police.uk data are more accurate at this
unit of analysis than at the postcode level. Future studies
might also disaggregate the data by time as well space.
The police.uk data do not indicate the day or time on
which offenses take place but they do indicate the month
of occurrence and so it would be useful to know if the
estimates are accurate on ﬁner timescales than one-year.
In conclusion, the provision of open access data is
increasing, with attendant beneﬁts to the academic and
other communities. While such data may be imperfect,
based on the analyses presented here, the police.uk data
appear to hold considerable promise as long as they are
analyzed at a suitable geographical resolution.
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Notes
1. For example West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Surrey,
Sussex, Devon and Cornwall and the Metropolitan Police.
2. However this is also because crime records are subject to
coding changes after they have been initially recorded. For
example, some incidents originally recorded may not be
classiﬁed as crimes once the Police have investigated the
circumstances. In addition, the data processing require-
ments on Forces would be very consuming if they had to
provide data in “real time” or at lower resolution than a
month.
3. The “snap point” masterlist was created in the ﬁrst instance
by taking the center point of every road in England and
Wales from the Ordnance Survey Locator dataset. Then
points of local relevance from the PointX dataset (such as
transportation hubs and large retail premises) were added.
These data were then subjected to analysis which used
Voronoi polygons to determine how many postal addresses
were contained in the catchment area for each snap point.
Any snap point which had fewer than eight addresses
associated with it were discarded to protect the privacy of
victims. Once the snap point masterlist had been created by
the police.uk website developers it was passed to Police
Forces for a human assessment. Over time a number of
snap points were added to the masterlist based on this
feedback.
4. It is unclear from the information on the police.uk website
whether these eight postal addresses have to be residential.
For the purposes of this study we are assuming that non-
residential postal addresses are not included in the snap
point list, as these are not as sensitive to the identiﬁcation
of victims as residential postal addresses.
5. For example from December 2010 until August 2011 there
were six categories (ASB, burglary, robbery, vehicle crime,
violent/sexual crime and other crime). From September
2011 until April 2013 there were 11 categories (the existing
ones plus criminal damage/arson, drugs, other theft, public
disorder/weapons and shoplifting). Since May 2013 there
have been 14 categories (the existing categories, minus
public/disorder and weapons (which was split into two),
plus bicycle theft and theft from the person).
6. The median was computed for the area size due to the
presence of extreme outliers in the data for that variable.
7. This was achieved by joining crime events to their nearest
postcode centroid (which fell within the West Midlands
Police area), and then using a lookup table – provided by
the Ofﬁce for National Statistics – to generate the Census
geography information. This resulted in a handful of post-
codes on the boundary of the study area being associated
with Census geography units that fell outside the study area,
and hence the loss of a small number of crime data points.
This way of deriving the areal unit information was consid-
ered preferable to spatial joins available in ArcGIS and the R
statistical programming software which double-counted
crime events which fell on boundary lines of areal units.
8. Areas were classed as being adjacent to one another if their
boundaries touched at any point (i.e., “queen” contiguity).
This was done in ArcMap 10.1 using the spatial join
feature to identify adjacent areas (by joining the data to
itself). Further information is available from the authors on
request.
9. Available from http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/
10. For example, we could compute the root mean squared
error (or simply the absolute difference) for the difference
between the police.uk and police recorded crime counts.
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 However, the same pattern of results emerge using this
method, and so we discuss this method no further (ﬁndings
are available upon request).
11. For the larger units of analysis, the trends were consistent
with those reported but the coefﬁcients associated with the
census and land use data were largely non-signiﬁcant.
12. Due to the data being count data, we also used a negative
binomial regression model to estimate parameters. The results,
which were largely the same, are available upon request.
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